From Communism to Confucianism

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NEW PERSPECTIVES QUARTERLY, WINTER 2010, Vol 27-2

From Communism to Confucianism:
China's Alternative to Liberal Democracy

Daniel A. Bell is professor of political philosophy at Tsinghua
University in Beijing and the author of China's New Confucianism: Politics and
Everyday Life in a Changing Society.
Beijing—Four decades ago, it would have been suicidal to say a good word
about Confucius in Beijing. Confucius was the reactionary enemy, and all Chinese
were encouraged to struggle against him. Chairman Mao himself was photographed
on the cover of a revolutionary newspaper that announced the desecration of
Confucius's grave in Qufu. My own university was a hotbed of extreme leftism.

How times have changed. Today, the Chinese Communist Party approves a
film about Confucius starring the handsome leading man Chow Yun-Fat. The master
is depicted as an astute military commander and teacher of humane and
progressive values, with a soft spot for female beauty. What does this say about
China's political future? Confucius bombed at the box office, leading many to
think that the revival of Confucianism will go the same way as the
anti-Confucius campaigns in the Cultural Revolution.
But perhaps it's just a bad movie. Confucius received the kiss of
death when it went head-to-head against the blockbuster Avatar. A vote for
Confucius was seen as a vote against the heroic blue creatures from outer space.
In the long term, however, Confucian revivalists may be on the right side of
history.
In the Cultural Revolution, Confucius was often just a label used to
attack political enemies. Today, Confucianism serves a more legitimate political
function; it can help to provide a new moral foundation for political rule in
China. Communism has lost the capacity to inspire the Chinese, and there is
growing recognition that its replacement needs to be grounded at least partly in
China's own traditions. As the dominant political tradition in China,
Confucianism is the obvious alternative.
The party has yet to re-label itself the Chinese Confucian Party, but
it has moved closer to an official embrace of Confucianism. The 2008 Olympics
highlighted Confucian themes, quoting The Analects of Confucius at the opening
ceremonies and playing down any references to China's experiment with communism.
Cadres at the newly built Communist Party school in Shanghai proudly tell
visitors that the main building is modeled on a Confucian scholar's desk.
Abroad, the government has been symbolically promoting Confucianism via branches
of the Confucius Institute, a Chinese-language and cultural center similar to
the Alliance Française.
Of course, there is resistance as well. Elderly cadres, still
influenced by Maoist antipathy to tradition, condemn efforts to promote
ideologies outside a rigid Marxist framework. But the younger cadres in their
40s and 50s tend to support such efforts, and time is on their side. It's easy
to forget that the 76-million-strong Chinese Communist Party is a large and
diverse organization. The party itself is becoming more meritocratic—it now
encourages high-performing students to join—and the increased emphasis on
educated cadres is likely to generate more sympathy for Confucian values.

But the revival of Confucianism is not just government-sponsore d. On
the contrary, the government is also reacting to developments outside its
control. There has been a resurgence of interest in Confucianism among academics
and in the Chinese equivalent of civil society. The renewed interest is driven
partly by normative concerns. Thousands of educational experiments around the
country promote the teaching of Confucian classics to young children; the
assumption is that better training in the humanities improves the virtue of the
learner. More controversially—because it's still too sensitive to publicly
discuss such questions in mainland China—Confucian thinkers put forward
proposals for constitutional reform aiming to humanize China's political system.

An Uphill Struggle | Yet, the problem is not just the Chinese government. It can be an
uphill struggle to convince people in Western countries that Confucianism can
offer a progressive and humane path to political reform in China. Why does the
revival of Confucianism so often worry Westerners? One reason may be a form of
self-love. For most of the 20th century, Chinese liberals and Marxists engaged
in a totalizing critique of their own heritage and looked to the West for
inspiration. It may have been flattering for Westerners—look, they want to be
just like us! —but there is less sympathy now that Chinese are taking pride in
their own traditions for thinking about social and political reform. But more
understanding and a bit of open-mindedness can take care of that problem.

Another reason may be that the revival of Confucianism is thought to
be associated with the revival of Islamic "fundamentalism" and its anti-Western
tendencies. Perhaps the revival of closed-minded and intolerant Christian
"fundamentalism" also comes to mind. But the revival of Confucianism in China is
not so opposed to liberal social ways (other than extreme individualistic
lifestyles, in which the good life is sought mainly outside social
relationships) . What it does propose is an alternative to Western political
ways, and that may be the main worry. But this worry stems from an honest
mistake: the assumption that less support for Western-style democracy means
increased support for authoritarianism. In China, packaging the debate in terms
of "democracy" versus "authoritarianism" crowds out possibilities that appeal to
Confucian political reformers.
Confucian reformers generally favor more freedom of speech in China.
What they question is democracy in the sense of Western-style competitive
elections as the mechanism for choosing the country's most powerful rulers. One
clear problem with "one person, one vote" is that equality ends at the
boundaries of the political community; those outside are neglected. The national
focus of the democratically elected political leaders is assumed; they are meant
to serve only the community of voters. Even democracies that work well tend to
focus on the interests of citizens and neglect the interests of foreigners. But
political leaders, especially leaders of big countries such as China, make
decisions that affect the rest of the world (consider global warming), and so
they need to consider the interests of the rest of the world.

Hence, reformist Confucians put forward political ideals that are
meant to work better than Western-style democracy in terms of securing the
interests of all those affected by the policies of the government, including
future generations and foreigners. Their ideal is not a world where everybody is
treated as an equal but one where the interests of non-voters would be taken
more seriously than in most nation-centered democracies. And the key value for
realizing global political ideals is meritocracy, meaning equality of
opportunity in education and government, with positions of leadership being
distributed to the most virtuous and qualified members of the community. The
idea is that everyone has the potential to become morally exemplary, but, in
real life, the capacity to make competent and morally justifiable political
judgments varies among people, and an important task of the political system is
to identify those with above-average ability.
CONFUCIAN VALUES IN PRACTICE | What might such values mean in practice? In the past decade,
Confucian intellectuals have put forward political proposals that aim to combine
"Western" ideas of democracy with "Confucian" ideas of meritocracy. Rather than
subordinating Confucian values and institutions to democracy as an a priori
dictum, they contain a division of labor, with democracy having priority in some
areas and meritocracy in others. If it's about land disputes in rural China,
farmers should have a greater say. If it's about pay and safety disputes,
workers should have a greater say. In practice, it means more freedom of speech
and association and more representation for workers and farmers in some sort of
democratic house.
But what about matters such as foreign policy and environmental
protection? What the government does in such areas affects the interests of
non-voters, and they need some form of representation as well. Hence, Confucian
thinkers put forward proposals for a meritocratic house of government, with
deputies selected by such mechanisms as free and fair competitive examinations,
that would have the task of representing the interests of non-voters typically
neglected by democratically selected decision-makers.
One obvious objection to examinations is that they cannot test for
the kinds of virtues that concerned Confucius—flexibility, humility, compassion
and public-spiritedness—and that, ideally, would also characterize political
decision-makers in the modern world. It's true that examinations won't test
perfectly for those virtues, but the question is whether deputies chosen by such
examinations are more likely to be farsighted than those chosen by elections.

There are reasons to believe so. Drawing on extensive empirical
research, Bryan Caplan's book The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies
Choose Bad Policies shows that voters are often irrational, and he suggests
tests of voter competence as a remedy. So examinations would test for basic
economic policy (and knowledge of international relations), but they would also
cover knowledge of the Confucian classics, testing for memorization as well as
interpretation. The leading Confucian political thinker, Jiang Qing, argues that
examinations could set a framework and moral vocabulary for subsequent political
actions, and successful candidates would also need to be evaluated in terms of
how they perform in practice.
Farfetched? It's no less
so than scenarios that envision a transition to Western-style liberal democracy
(because both scenarios assume a more open society). And it answers the key
worry about the transition to democracy: that it translates into short-term,
unduly nationalistic policymaking. It's also a matter of what standards we
should use to evaluate China's political progress. Politically speaking, most
people think China should look more like the West. But one day, perhaps, we will
hope that the West looks more like China.