Dua keynote address conference tersebut adalah dari Dr. Sherman Jackson dan
Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi yang membahas buku baru Shaikh Yusuf Qaradawi "The
Fiqh of Jihad: a comparative study of its rulings and philosophy in light of
the Quran and Sunnah."
Buku ini sebanding dengan buku Fiqh Zakat dalam hal detail riset dan
kelengkapannya (2 volume, 1400 halaman). Beliau banyak membahas tentang
ayatul saif (ayat pedang) yang antum kutip. Kalau disederhanakan,
kesimpulannya sejalan dengan yang antum tulis.
Berikut transkrip dari lecturenya Sheikh Ghannouchi
In the name of Allah, Most Merciful, Most Beneficen
The importance of this conference is due to its focus on the most critical
concept in contemporary Islamic thought- that of Jihad, which occupies an
important position in the edifice of Islam. Jihad is "the summit of Islam
and its pinnacle" according to the hadith, and is the subject of widely
divergent views and stances from within and outside Islam, views which have
serious consequences for international relations, in view of Islam's growing
role internationally.
Those views, moreover, have an effect on relations between Muslims
themselves, with their governments, and with non-Muslims, in view of the
awakening witnessed across the Muslim world, both at the level of faith and
the level of practice. This has led to a greater connection between Islam as
a religion (creed, rituals, morals) and an ideology of great influence on
the thought and behaviour of Muslims, socially and politically, or what is
known as "political Islam", in which jihad occupies a central position in
one way or another.
This paper owes its importance to the position of the figure whose views on
this crucial concept it attempts to present - that is Sheikh Yusuf
al-Qaradawi, who occupies an important position in contemporary Islam, as
testified by his role at various levels: at the intellectual level, his
writings have exceeded 150 works, covering all aspects of Islamic thought.
In addition to his membership of the major intellectual and juristic
councils, he was elected President of the International Union of Muslim
Scholars, as well as being the chairman of the European Council for Fatwa
and Research and a number of charity organisations, and a member of various
Islamic Studies academic committees, including the Oxford Centre for Islamic
Studies. As for "political Islam", he grew up inside one of its groups, the
"Muslim Brotherhood", occupying leading positions within it. He is also a
rising star in the world of modern media, through his patronage of the most
important Muslim website Islam-online, and through his famous weekly program
on Aljazeera channel "Shar`iah and Life" which is followed weekly by over 60
million viewers.
Al-Qaradawi has developed a principal theory in contemporary Islam, from
which all his views and stances emanate, and to which he tirelessly calls,
widening its appeal and marginalizing its opponents - that is the principle
of Islamic Wasatiyya or moderation. This was inspired by the verse in the
second chapter of the Quran, "And thus we made you into a middle (wasat)
nation." Thus, he presents Islam as the middle position between opposing and
conflicting rigid positions; as the middle ground that brings all together,
- a middle position between materialism and spiritualism, between
individualism and collectivism, between idealism and realism, etc. Starting
from this wasati viewpoint, he presents all his ijtihads in all aspects of
Islamic thought, including his ijtihad on the question of jihad, as revealed
in his latest book "The Fiqh of Jihad: a comparative study of its rulings
and philosophy in light of the Quran and Sunnah". This study was described
by its author as one which "took several years of continuous work, and
occupied his thought for decades". The fruits of this work are presented in
a momentous book of two volumes, in which he puts forward, from the wasati
perspective, his views on this critical issue, elaborating his theory on
jihad, which he hopes will contribute towards forming consensus on this
grave matter. The book springs from the conviction that "it is dangerous
and wrong to misunderstand jihad, to shed inviolate blood in its name, to
violate property and lives and to taint Muslims and Islam with violence and
terrorism, while Islam is completely innocent of such an accusation.
However, our problem in such grave matters is that the truth gets lost
between the two extremes of exaggeration and laxity."
Our exposition of this momentous work will focus on clarifying the general
view of jihad in Islam according to Shaykh Qaradawi based on the Quran and
the Sunnah and their interaction with the tafsir and fiqh heritage as seen
in the historical contexts in which it emerged, and through the current
state of the Muslim ummah as it is engaged in major conflicts with the
forces of despotism or with external forces, under the current power
balances, a modern culture that glorifies the value of freedom, and an
international law that recognises state sovereignty and limits legitimate
war to self-defence. Within these contexts, Al-Qaradawi's view of jihad was
formed. What we wish to explore is not its details, but the general picture
- what is novel in it, particularly in relation to major questions, such as
jihad's relation to freedom, and to relations between Muslims and others,
whether it is inside or outside Muslim societies. So, what are the
foundations of this methodology? What is jihad? What are its forms? What are
its goals? Defensive or offensive? Between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr?
What are the rulings regarding captives in Islam? Is there jihad within the
ummah? Where is jihad in the ummah's current causes?
1. Issues of methodology:
In the introduction, the author defined the foundations for his study thus:
a. Relying on the Quran as the absolutely authentic text which
serves as the criterion for other sources including the Prophetic Sunnah. It
is to be understood using the logic of its original language, Arabic,
without forcing meaning onto the text, and on the basis that all its verses
were revealed to be applied, "thus we questioned at length the claim of
those who say that there is a verse in the Quran, which they called Ayat
al-Sayf (the verse of the sword), which has allegedly abrogated one hundred
and forty verses or more, although they differed over which verse that is".
The author almost entirely invalidates the principle of abrogation in the
Quran, depriving the extremists of a sharp weapon with which they have
disabled hundreds of verses promoting kindness, forgiveness, dealing with
non-Muslims with wisdom and beautiful preaching and distinguishing between a
hostile unjust minority amongst non-Muslims with which defensive jihad can
be used, and a peaceful majority towards which justice and kindness are due.
b. Relying on authentic Sunnah which does not contradict stronger
evidence, such as the Quran. Thus the author judges as weak sayings such as
"I was sent with the sword" and others, using the tools of the science of
Hadith. He also interprets an authentic hadith which commands fighting
against people until they say "there is no God but Allah", by taking the
generic word "people" as being used to mean a specific group, that is the
hostile Arab polytheists.
c. Benefiting from the rich heritage of fiqh, without bias towards a
particular school, and without restricting oneself to the well-known
schools, basing himself on the methods of comparative law, analysis,
critique and selecting the most suitable opinion. He distinguishes between
Fiqh and Shariah: the latter being of divine origin, and the former the
product of intellectual effort to deduce the rulings of Shariah. True fiqh
is not what is copied from books, but rather the jurist's own ijtihad
(intellectual exertion) to produce something suitable for his specific time
and place, particularly as in our time, major changes have taken place.
d. Using the method of comparison between Islam and other religions
and legal systems.
e. Relating fiqh to the current reality: The Muslim faqih (jurist)
when speaking about jihad must realise the fixed principles in this matter,
such as the law of tadaafu` (mutual checking), the obligation to prepare all
possible sources of power to ward off the enemies, and to fight against
those who initiate fighting against the Muslims, the prohibition of
transgression, etc. There are, however, other matters that have emerged
(considered mutaghayyirat, or changing factors), such as condemnation of
war, seeking peace, and the emergence of international law, human rights
conventions, the United Nations, and the sovereignty of states. In this
respect, the author affirms that "we can live, under Islam, in a world that
promotes peace and security rather than fear, tolerance rather than
fundamentalism, love rather than hatred. We can live with the United
Nations, international law, human rights conventions and environmentalist
groups. In truth, our main problem with our rigid brothers who have closed
all doors and insisted on a single viewpoint is that they live in the past
and not the present, in books rather than reality".
f. Adopting the methodology of wasatiyya (moderation) in da'wah
(preaching), teaching, ifta' (issuing legal edicts), research, reform and
revival. Among the principles of this methodology in fiqh is to revive
religion from within, through new ijtihads for our time, just as our
previous scholars did for their time, through understanding secondary texts
in the light of primary objectives, being firm when it comes to usool
(fundamentals) and flexible in furu` (secondary matters), seeking wisdom
whatever its source, and balancing between contemporary changes and Shariah
fundamentals.
g. While studying "Fiqh al-Jihad", one can easily perceive its
author's care not to present himself as the sole proponent of the above
views amongst jurists. Instead he is very keen to refer to supporting views
amongst old and contemporary scholars, even if such views were neglected or
ignored, removing the dust that had collected and shedding light on them,
presenting them in a more attractive appearance, and thus giving them new
life. He is also careful to support his views with relevant values and
expertise from modern culture, benefiting from his profound knowledge of the
sources of Islamic culture and his familiarity with modern culture. Thus he
constructs a new, coherent, well-rooted yet contemporary view of Islamic
jihad, one which shares a wide common space with contemporary culture in
relation to war and peace. What is new in this view is not the details, for
its parts are scattered and buried deep inside books, but rather the whole
picture, making this work a meeting point and a point of consensus, wherein
all - or most - parties can find something familiar that facilitates their
acceptance of what is unfamiliar. This ability to build consensus is a
traditional characteristic of the great scholars. Thus the author does not
exaggerate when describing the dire need among jurists, lawyers, Islamists,
historians, Orientalists, diplomats, politicians, military men, and the
educated masses for such a study.
2. The essence of jihad and its forms:
No Islamic concept has been the target of a continuous flow of attacks, and
has brought a constant flow of attacks to Islam and Muslims, as much as that
of jihad. It has fallen into the two extremes of exaggeration and laxity.
The latter is promoted by a group that wants to abolish jihad from the life
of the ummah, spreading the spirit of submission and surrender, under the
guise of various calls such as tolerance and peace, described by the author
as "agents of colonialism whose hostility to jihad is such that it has gone
as far as creating groups which fabricated an Islam without jihad, and
devoted themselves to promoting it, such as Bahais and Qadianis. At the
other extreme, there is another group that makes of the concept of jihad a
raging war it wages against the whole world, taking the natural state of
things in relation to non-Muslims to be that of war, and regarding all
people as enemies of Muslims, as long as they are not Muslim". This latter
group may agree with those Orientalists who define jihad, as in the
encyclopaedia of Islam as "spreading Islam by the sword, an individual duty
upon all Muslims, such that it is almost a sixth pillar of Islam"
(Encyclopaedia of Islam, Arabic Translation, p. 2778).
The author tackles this extremism on both sides, through the linguistic
analysis of the word jihad, which essentially means exerting oneself, making
an effort, and through its occurrence in the Quran and Sunnah and its use by
Muslim jurists. He concludes that there is a clear distinction between jihad
and qital (fighting), as the command to engage in jihad was revealed in
Mecca where there was no fighting, but rather jihad of da'wah (preaching)
through the Quran, "And strive against them with the utmost endeavour with
it (the Quran)" (p. 50-52). The word is also used in the Quran and Sunnah
with various meanings, including exerting oneself in resisting the enemy,
resisting the devil, resisting one's desires, etc. Thus the word jihad is
much wider than just fighting, for jihad, as the author quotes from Ibn
Taymiyya, "can be with the heart, by calling to Islam, by countering invalid
arguments, by advising or facilitating what is beneficial to Muslims, or by
one's body, that is fighting".
The author further seeks support from a fourteenth century scholar, the
eminent Ibn al-Qayyim, student of Ibn Taymiyya, in order to clarify the vast
scope of jihad, which makes every Muslim a mujahid - but not a muqatil
(fighter) by necessity. Ibn al-Qayyim concluded from his study of the
process of Islamic da'wah that there are 13 levels of jihad: first, jihad
al-nafs (jihad of the self) which comprises 4 levels, exerting oneself to
learn the guidance, to act upon it, to call to it, and to persevere on those
actions; second, jihad against shaytan, which includes 2 levels, struggling
against the doubts in one's faith which Satan instigates, and resisting the
desires and corruption to which he calls; third, jihad against the
non-believers and hypocrites, including 4 levels: with one's heart, tongue,
wealth, and self; and fourth, jihad against the oppressors and the corrupt,
comprising 3 levels: with one's hand if possible, if not then with one's
tongue, if not then with one's heart. The author differs in regarding jihad
against oppression and corruption as preceding jihad against disbelief and
external transgression, while stressing that peaceful confrontation is to be
adopted against oppressors "profiting from the reasonable forms which others
have developed in confronting unjust rulers, such as elected parliaments,
parties, and the separation of powers" (p. 198).
The author also stresses the importance of intellectual and cultural jihad
"through the establishment of specialist Islamic academic centres, catering
for exceptional youth - academically and morally - in order to prepare them
academically and intellectually in a methodology that unites our heritage
and modern culture. We do not call for isolation from the rest of the world,
but rather to cultural and civilisational interaction. We choose what to
take or leave based on our own philosophy and criteria, just as they had
borrowed from us in the past concepts and inventions which they then
developed and used to build their civilization. What we take will be imbued
with our own spirit, character and moral heritage such that it becomes a
part of our intellectual and moral system, losing its original character"
(p. 190-192).
The author concludes in his study of the fiqh of jihad in Islam that there
are two types of jihad: civil and military - meaning fighting against
enemies who attack Muslims, which necessitates preparing for it when there
is a need; this type is a matter for states. Spiritual civil jihad
"encompasses the academic, scientific, cultural, social, economic,
educational, health, medical, environmental and civilisational fields. The
objective of this civil jihad is to exert oneself for Allah's sake in order
to educate the ignorant, employ the unemployed, train workers, feed the
hungry, clothe the naked, house the homeless, treat the ill, achieve
self-sufficiency for the needy, build schools for pupils, universities for
students, mosques for worshippers, clubs for sports lovers to practice their
hobbies" (p. 215).
3. Objectives of jihad
Islam is a call to peace; it abhors war, but cannot prevent it, hence it
prepares for it, but does not wage it unless it is forced upon it, which is
due to Islam's realistic nature and its recognition of sunnat al-tadafu`,
the law of mutual checking. However it has sought to limit its consequences
by surrounding it with rules and ethics. Islam has not been the exception in
recognising war of necessity amongst other religions, including
Christianity, whose followers have been among the most frequent participants
in conflicts and wars, both against other Christians and against others.
Luke's Gospel reads "I have come to bring fire on the earth. Do you think I
came to bring peace on earth?". The Old Testament contains numerous calls to
genocide, against 7 nations that inhabited Palestine that had to be
completely eradicated- such that the modern calls to "transfer" and
massacres committed by modern Zionist gangs are but miniature versions.
Jihad in Islam has specific objectives which Al-Qaradawi summarises as
repelling transgression; preventing fitna- that is guaranteeing freedom of
faith for Muslims and others; saving the oppressed; punishing those who
break treaties, and enforcing internal peace within the ummah. Thus,
expansion and appropriation are not amongst the objectives of jihad, nor is
the eradication of disbelief from this world, for that is against God's law
of difference and mutual checking. Nor do the objectives of jihad include
imposing Islam on those who do not believe in it, for that contravenes God's
law of diversity and pluralism (pp. 423).
4. Military Jihad: Between Daf' and Talab (Defensive and Offensive Jihad)
Following the tradition of classical and contemporary jurists, Al-Qaradawi
questions the nature of jihad and its status in Islam: Is it of a religious
nature, meaning it is obligatory upon Muslims to fight non-believers until
they embrace Islam or submit to its authority, which they call jihad
al-talab, that is voluntary offensive jihad? Or is it of a political nature,
necessitated by the need to defend the lands of Islam against transgressors
and to defend Muslims against those who prevent them from freedom of faith,
and the oppressed generally- which they have termed jihad al-daf`, that is
necessary defensive jihad, which, if Muslims must engage it, should be
engaged in with pure intentions, for God's sake, and following strict
ethical guidelines which cannot be neglected.
Classically, and in the modern era, jurists have been divided between two
groups, which al-Qaradwi calls the hujumiyyin (proponents of offensive
jihad) and difa`iyyin (proponents of defensive jihad), proclaiming his proud
adherence to the second group. The hujumiyyin consider it an obligation for
the Muslim nation to attack the land of the non-believers at least once a
year in order to call to Islam and expand its territories. They hold
disbelief per se as a sufficient reason to initiate war and legitimate
killing, even if non-believers do not attack or harm Muslims, to the extent
that Muslims would be sinful if they do not do so. The proponents of this
view, a large number of jurists, most prominent of which among classical
scholars is Imam al-Shafi`i, and among contemporary thinkers are Sayyid Qutb
and al-Mawdudi, support their view with evidence from the Quran and the
Sunnah, and from historical practice. The Quranic texts used call for
fighting against all polytheists, such as verse 36 of surat al-Tawba "and
fight the polytheists all together as they fight you all together", verse 5
"Kill the idolaters wherever you find them", and verse 29 "Fight those who
believe not in Allah nor the Last Day. until they pay the Jizya with willing
submission". They differed as to which of those verses is the one they
called Ayat al-Sayf, or verse of the sword, which, according to them,
abrogated all contradicting verses, over 200 such verses calling for mercy,
forgiveness and freedom of belief, prohibiting compulsion in faith and
severity, and considering the judgment of people's faith a matter to be left
to God alone. They also sought support from prophetic sayings such as "I
have been commanded to fight people until they say 'there is no God but
Allah'" (narrated by Bukhari). They also consider the early Islamic
conquests as evidence for their view that war, rather than peace, is the
natural state in Muslims' dealings with others.
Al-Qaradawi's disagreement with the above group does not prevent him from
looking for excuses for them, particularly classical scholars, due to the
relations between states at their time, which were based on power and war,
and due to the existential threat to which Islam had been subjected since
its birth in the Arab peninsula.
Al-Qaradawi stresses, alongside classical and contemporary scholars, the
consensus that jihad becomes obligatory upon every Muslim if a Muslim land
is attacked, or Muslims suffer fitna (are prevented from freedom of faith),
and that every Muslim must practice some form of jihad, be it striving
against one's desires, against evil and corruption, and striving to promote
good and support religion, as much as one is able to. However, Al-Qaradawi,
through his study and analysis of the various texts related to jihad and the
views of classical and contemporary scholars concluded the following:
1. That Quranic verses, particularly those of surat al-Tawba commanding
fighting against all polytheists, are to be understood as a reaction and an
equal retribution, just as the verse says "as they fight you all together",
and not a general command or a basis for dealing with all non-Muslims, but
was rather concerning a specific group of the Arab polytheists which
declared war on Islam since its emergence, chased it out and followed it to
its new home, broke treaties and mobilized everyone to eradicate it "Will
you not fight people who violated their oaths, plotted to expel the
Messenger, and took the aggressive by being the first to assault you?" (The
Quran, 9:13). Within the same chapter, as well as in other chapters, there
are limits and conditions restricting the above -seemingly general- command:
"And if they incline to peace, then incline to it" (8:61). There is no need
to set one verse of the Quran against another; rather one should look at all
relevant verses and ahadith, all of which confirm the rule that Islam seeks
peace with those who are peaceful towards it, and fights those who fight it.
2. Military jihad is not an individual obligation upon every Muslim, of the
same level as the obligations of the testimony of faith, prayer, fasting,
alms giving and pilgrimage, for despite its importance within Islam, it was
not included in the inherent characteristics of the God-conscious in surat
al-Baqara, nor in the characteristics of the believers as described in surat
al-Anfal or surat al-Mu'minun, nor in the characteristics of those with true
understanding as described in surat al-Ra`d, nor in the characteristics of
the servants of the Most Merciful as described in surat al-Furqan, nor in
the characteristics of the pious in surat al-Dhariat, nor of the righteous
ones described in surat al-Insan. Thus, the practice of military jihad only
becomes an obligation upon Muslims when its conditions arise such as an
attack on Muslims, their land or their religion. Preparing for such an
incidence, on the other hand, is an obligation upon them, according to their
ability, in order to deter enemies and maintain peace.
3. There is no obligation upon Muslims to invade the lands of non-Muslims,
if they are safe from them. It is sufficient for them to have a powerful
army in possession of the latest weapons and trained soldiers guarding their
borders and deterring enemies such that the latter do not thing of attacking
Muslims, for the collective duty to be fulfilled (p. 91). It is worth noting
that Al-Qaradawi prefers using the term non-Muslims instead of kuffar or
disbelievers, for that is the way of the Quran which uses the terms "O
people of the Book", "O people", "O Man", "O Children of Israel", "My
people", "O Children of Adam". It never addressed non-Muslims as
disbelievers, except in a few exceptional cases where there were
negotiations regarding creed.
4. Islam recognised freedom of belief and each individual's responsibility
for his belief before God. On that basis, its societies, on the whole, did
not experience religious wars. Under it, various monotheistic and pagan
religions coexisted and continue to coexist, under the system of Dhimma
which granted citizenship to non-Muslims regardless of religion. All they
needed to do in order to enjoy the rights of protection by the Muslim state
alongside Muslims was for those able to pay the jizya tax to do so, which is
equivalent to the military service tax in some modern systems. According to
Al-Qaradawi, unifying the tax rate and generalising military service make
such a system which has been misunderstood and misused unnecessary.
5. It was historical conditions, rather than the texts of Islam, that made
many jurists believe offensive jihad to invade non-Muslim lands to be
obligatory. The ummah was constantly threatened by its powerful neighbours,
the Persians and Romans (p. 82), and there were no international laws based
on mutual recognition of state sovereignty and prohibition of hostility as
is the case today- despite their contravention by the powerful.
6. The natural state of affairs in relations between Muslim and others is
peace and cooperation in goodness. Islam abhors war and only engages in it
unwillingly and as a necessity "Fighting is prescribed for you, though it is
hateful to you" (Quran, 2:216). Peace is the essential character of Islam;
it is the greeting of Muslims, the greeting of the people of Paradise, it is
one of the names of Allah. The most hated name in Allah's sight is Harb-
which means war, one of the ancient Arab names, as Arabs were warriors.
However, when the Prophet, peace be upon him, was told by his son-in-law
that his daughter Fatima had given birth to a boy and that he called him
Harb, he commanded him to name him Hasan (meaning good).
7. Islam welcomes international conventions that prohibit transgression and
promote peace between nations, and welcomes international bodies that
protect such laws, such as the United Nations, UNESCO, etc. However, the
West still maintains its belief in the principle of power in its relation
with other states and other nations. An example of that is the exclusive
enjoyment of its major states of the right to veto, in a flagrant disregard
for the principle of equality, thus guaranteeing the protection of their
interest and the avoidance of any condemnation of its violations, as the US
and UK did in their invasion of Iraq, without any legitimacy, with full
impunity from any condemnation, and similarly with their continuous
protection of the Zionists' various forms of hostility against Palestine and
its people.
8. Under international recognition of human rights, including freedom of
belief and preaching, as well as freedom to establish institutions and
protect minorities, one of the principal justifications of jihad al-talab
becomes redundant, that is invasion in order to enable the call to Islam by
dismantling oppressive regimes which used to prevent their people from
thinking freely or choosing beliefs that are different to those of their
rulers, such as the Pharaoh who reprimanded the Children of Israel for
believing without his permission: "He said: You believe in him before I give
you leave?" (Quran, 20:71). In contrast, today, unprecedentedly, in any
previous era of Islam history, mosques and Muslim minorities are found
everywhere, making our need greater for "huge armies of competent preachers,
teachers, media experts, all suitably trained and able to address the world
in its different languages, and using methods of this modern age, which,
unfortunately, we possess less than a thousandth of what is required",
(p.16). Al-Qaradawi laments that you may find many who are ready to die for
Allah's sake, but very few who are willing to live for His sake.
9. The sources of Islam reveal that, according to Islam, the world is three
abodes: dar al-Islam, the abode of Islam, where its law reigns, where its
rituals are publicly practiced, and where its adherents and preachers are
secure; Dar al-`ahd- the abode of accord, that is states between which and
the Muslim state there is mutual recognition and prohibition of hostility;
and finally dar harb, or the abode of war. Al-Qaradawi regards Muslims, in
view of their being part of the system of the United Nations, as being in a
state of accord/pact with other states, except with the Zionist state,
because of its usurpation of the land of Palestine and its dispossession of
its people, which unfortunately took place with the support of major states.
Thus Al-Qaradawi considers the greatest problem in our relation with the
West to be its constant and unlimited support of Israel and its continuous
aggression against Palestine and its people.
10. Al-Qaradawi distinguishes between jihad and irhab- terrorism, or between
legitimate irhab -being feared by the enemy to deter it from any aggression,
and illegitimate irhab, that is terrorizing innocent people as done by
groups using the name of Islam, which declare world on the whole world in an
illegitimate use of jihad in an inappropriate setting, terrorizing innocent
people- Muslims and non-Muslims- in order to achieve alleged political ends
inside or outside Muslim lands, flagrantly contravening the principles and
ethics of jihad in Islam. Hence Al-Qaradawi condemned violent acts committed
by extremist groups in Muslim and non-Muslim countries against innocent
people, whether tourists or others. He further stripped the indiscriminate
killing and shedding of innocent lives committed by these groups of any
legitimacy.
11. Al-Qaradawi is extremely careful to distinguish between extremist groups
that declare war on the whole world, killing indiscriminately, tainting the
image of Islam and providing its enemies with fatal weapons to use against
it, on the one hand, and on the other groups resisting occupation. And as
much as he condemns the former and delegitimizes its foundations, he defends
the latter, and calls on the ummah to support them, particularly in
Palestine, as long as their operations are against military targets. He does
not hesitate to justify martyrdom operations, considering them to be the
weapon of one with no other options, who is deprived of equivalent weapons
to those of the enemy, in order to defend his home and his land. God's
justice does not allow the weak to be completely deprived of any weapon,
hence the latter's use of his own body as a deterrent weapon. In any case,
the ethics of jihad must always be respected, and only combatants can be
targeted.
12. As he stresses that the first jihad to be obligatory upon the ummah in
this age is liberation from colonialism, particularly in Palestine,
Al-Qaradawi warns and stresses the fallacy of those who wrongly believe that
the conflict between us and Zionists is due to the fact that they are
Semites- for we are also Semites, both of us coming from the progeny of
Abraham- or that it is a religious conflict- for Muslims regard Jews as
People of the Book, whose food is lawful, with whom marriage is lawful, and
who have lived amongst Muslims in safety and have sought refuge in our lands
when Spain and other European countries expelled them, finding refuge
nowhere but among Muslims. In reality, the conflict between us and Zionists
started for one single reason: their appropriation of the land of Palestine,
dispossessed its people, and imposed their presence with violence. The
conflict will continue as long as its causes remain. No one can give up any
Muslim land, but it is possible to have a truce with Israel for an agreed
period of time. As for the principle of "Land for Peace", it is indeed a
bizarre principle imposed by the logic of the enemy's brute force, for the
land is our land, not the enemy's, so that it can bargain it in return for
peace (p. 1090).
13. Just as he, and his mentor Sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazali, had a leading
role in confronting those extremist groups and preventing them from
hijacking Islam and diverting it from its mainstream towards the margins,
through stripping their actions of any legitimacy based on jihad, both
inside and outside Muslim lands, Al-Qaradawi praised the important revisions
made by the most important of those groups, which found great support in his
writings- after having attacked and rejected his views- in order to engage
in their revisions, which he described as brave and enlightened (p. 1168).
5. Ethics of Jihad:
"War in Islam is ethical, just like politics, economics, science and work,
none which is divorced from ethics, in contrast to war in western
civilisation, which is not necessarily bound by ethics." For Muslims, war is
governed by a moral code, because morals are not an option, but rather an
essential part of religion. That includes: a) Islam's prohibition of the use
of unethical methods to infiltrate the enemy and obtain their secrets-
including sex, intoxicants, etc. b) prohibition of transgression, as the
Quran commands "Fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against
you, but do not transgress. Lo! Allah loveth not aggressors." (2:190). The
author interprets transgression to mean killing non-combatants, by killing
women, children, the elderly, the ill, farmers, and others not engaged in
fighting (p. 728). The ethics of jihad also include the prohibition of
mutilation of the enemy. c) the fulfilment of agreements and prohibition of
treachery and betrayal. d) Prohibition of cutting down trees and demolishing
buildings. e) The non-legitimacy, islamically, of what is called weapons of
mass destruction, such as chemical, biological or nuclear weapons which
kills thousands or millions at once, without discriminating between the
guilty and innocent, destroying life and all living beings. Islam prohibits
the use of such weapons, because Islam prohibits the killing of
non-combatants, as the Prophet, peace be upon him, strongly condemned the
killing of one woman in one battle. However, that does not prevent the ummah
from seeking to acquire such deterrent weapons, since others are in
possession of them and can threaten Muslims nations with those weapons,
particularly as the Zionist enemy which has usurped its land is in
possession of such weapons, and their scripture legitimises the obliteration
of all their neighbours. What is astonishing is that America and other great
nations prohibit other nations from possessing these weapons, while they
themselves possess them. They prevent Arab and Muslim states from acquiring
them, while Israel possesses over two hundred nuclear heads. The mutual
deterrence between the western and eastern blocks had contributed to the
maintenance of world peace, and similarly between India and Pakistan. Such
weapons cannot be used, except in the most exceptional circumstances, when a
nation is subject to an existential threat (p. 592). F) Islam enjoins its
mujahidin to treat captives kindly. After a detailed discussion of all texts
and all juristic opinions concerning war captives, particularly on the
question of whether they can be killed, the author concluded that the final
ruling is that revealed in surat Muhammad "either set them free as a favor
or let them ransom (themselves)" (47:4), possibly with the exception of war
criminals. On the whole, the author approves the articles of the Geneva
Convention regarding the treatment of captives.
In conclusion: Al-Qaradawi's study on the fiqh of jihad can be regarded as
an authentic Islamic ijtihad, upholding the principle of jihad as an eternal
Islamic mechanism of defence in its wider meaning, one which has suffered a
great number of misrepresentations leading to tainting the image of Islam.
Al-Qaradawi recuperates the effectiveness and moderation of this mechanism,
taking it out of the hands of extremists. His courage in standing up to the
campaigns waged against the concept of Islam has been just as great as his
courage in rejecting the arguments of extremist groups who declare war
against the entire world. He did not shy away from criticising the great
number of jurists who uphold the principle of offensive war (jihad
al-talab), nor was he ashamed of his proud adherence to the group believing
in jihad as defensive only. He continues to counter the arguments of the
former group, without fear or hesitation, without injustice, undermining or
misrepresenting the views of those he disagrees with, but rather he seeks
excuses for them. He has continued to do so, until he almost destroyed what
is known as jihad al-talab, establishing instead defensive jihad in its
wider meaning, jihad with no trace of relation to the charge of terrorism
-which he clearly distinguishes from legitimate resistance of occupation-, a
jihad with ethics that agree with international conventions and their
principles, values and laws prohibiting aggression, occupation, the use of
weapons of mass destruction and the torture of captives; a jihad that
welcomes an open world in which ideas and persons move freely, dealing
through proofs and arguments rather than violence and power, until the most
valid triumphs. Through such a presentation of jihad, Al-Qaradawi has opened
a vast space for dialogue, tolerance, agreement and coexistence between
Islam and other religions, human values, and international accords, enabling
a response to the eternal Quranic call "O mankind! Lo! We have created you
male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one
another. Lo! the noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in
conduct." (49:13)
From a lecture at Edinburgh University :: September 9, 2009 :: Source - Here
<http://ghannoushi.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=298:qara
dawi>
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